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ABSTRACT 
 
Developments in information gathering and processing have led to considerable interest in micro-
marketing.  In the quest for increased profits, managers of retail chains may be attracted to the idea of 
customizing prices to the store level according to local demand and competitive conditions.  For example, 
if chain stores face lower demand and/or more competition in some locations than others, it may be 
tempting to price lower in those areas.  However, we show generally and illustrate through means of a 
specific model that there is a strategic incentive to soften competition by committing not to customize 
prices at the store level and instead adopt uniform pricing across the store network.  Moreover, for a range 
of parameter values that we characterize, this incentive is sufficiently strong to allow for higher profits to 
be achieved under uniform pricing rather than local pricing.  We also show that the strategic incentive is 
enhanced when all firms in the industry agree (or are obliged by a competition authority) to adopt a 
similar policy, and even that there are cases where both firms and consumers (as a group) are benefited 
thereby. 
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  Micro-Marketing and Chain-Store Competition 
1.  Introduction 
Large national or regional chain store groups now dominate most sectors of retailing.  Competition has 
become focused on a battle between large chains with a resultant squeeze on independents.  In their 
relentless drive for further growth, chains often appear to have the best of both worlds.  They have the 
cost savings and marketing clout of a large purchaser coupled with the potential flexibility to tailor offers 
across the local markets they serve. This potential flexibility has been realized through developments in 
information gathering and processing and has led to considerable interest by retail managers in micro-
marketing, or the customization of marketing mix variables to the store-level (Montgomery 1997).  The 
question we examine in this paper is whether the prospect of tuning prices to particular conditions can 
have negative impacts on the firm through the competitive process.  In short, are there circumstances 
where micro-marketing reduces income? 
At a basic level, micro-marketing may involve determining price bands for a zone pricing policy, 
whereby stores are clustered together according to general price bands.  More sophisticated micro-
marketing may involve store-by-store customization of individual product prices.  Also, the approach can 
extend considerably beyond prices to cover a multitude of other store-level marketing elements.  Thus, at 
the heart of micro-marketing, and in common with all of its possible forms, lies the concept of offering 
the customers of a store in one location something different from the chain’s consumer offer in another 
location.  When applied to setting different store-level price bands, it represents a form of third-degree 
price discrimination, with consumers in one location paying higher prices and thus being in a worse 
position than consumers in another location. 
One concern for managers using micro-marketing might be negative consumer sentiment towards 
a retailer using discriminatory practices that would detrimentally impact on the chain’s image and/or have 
an adverse effect on overall demand.1  Another might be arbitrage. 
The concern we focus on is different.  A retailer’s use of micro-marketing may impact on 
competition.  Hence, insights from single-firm models can be misleading.  In particular, a price-led micro-
marketing policy based on meeting or beating local competition may alter competitor behavior, possibly 
triggering more aggressive responses and thereby intensifying competition.  This is an especially 
                                                     
1 Anderson and Simester (2001) raise a quality signaling issue in this regard.  If negative consumer sentiment is the 
concern then the retailer might look to micro-marketing strategies that have broadly neutral consumer welfare 
effects.  For example, Montgomery (1997) suggests adjusting store-level prices while holding the average category 
price and revenues at a constant level.  Alternatively Chintagunta et al. (2003) propose using balanced price 
discrimination strategies across stores that generate additional profits without appropriating “too much” consumer 
surplus.  Even with these restrictions, Montgomery’s (1997) analysis indicates that micro-marketing pricing 
strategies could increase gross profit margins by 4% to 10% over a uniform pricing strategy, feeding through to an 
increase in operating profit margins of 33% to 83%.  Chintangunta et al. (2003) find that a constrained store-level 
pricing policy could yield additional gross profits of 5.6% to 7.4% over uniform pricing (compared with an increase 
of 9.6% to 16.3% for unconstrained store-level pricing). 
1 
  Micro-Marketing and Chain-Store Competition 
important consideration when micro-marketing covers most or all (rather than just a few) product 
categories and store-wide prices will be affected, so increasing the chance of there being an intensification 
of retail price competition. 
We develop a model of retail oligopoly, governed by competition between rival chains, to 
examine the impact on profits of customizing store-level prices, which we term “local pricing”, by 
comparison with the retailer adopting “uniform pricing”, namely chain-wide prices applicable to all their 
stores.  We show both a general tendency and provide an illustrative characterization of when it is in a 
firm’s interests to price uniformly across stores. 
Concerns about whether customizing prices intensifies competition have been the subject of a 
burgeoning literature on price discrimination in oligopoly (e.g. see Stole (2005) and Armstrong (2006) for 
detailed surveys).2  A particularly useful distinction to emerge has been between what Corts (1998) terms 
“best-response symmetry” and “best-response asymmetry” situations, in which, respectively, competitors 
hold the same or opposite view as to whether markets are “strong” or “weak”.   
Under best-response asymmetry, clear results can emerge where all prices may fall with “all-out 
competition” or may rise with “all-out price gouging”, depending on the extent to which rivals 
aggressively target consumers with tastes more naturally inclined towards their rivals.3  Moreover, the 
finer the degree of market segmentation and the more precise the information on consumers, in the limit 
offering personalized pricing (i.e. first-degree price discrimination), the more exaggerated the net effect 
on prices may become (e.g. Shaffer and Zhang 2002, Chen and Iyer 2002, Liu and Serfes 2004, Acquisti 
and Varian 2005, and Ghose et al. 2005). 
By contrast, our focus is on arguably more relevant “best-response symmetry” situations, where 
firms share the same view on what constitutes a strong market (indicating potential for higher prices) and 
a weak market (suggesting lower prices).  This applies to local retail markets where retailers’ positions 
are more dependent on market conditions which affect all players (e.g. the area is affluent rather than poor 
or competition is limited as opposed to intense) than on idiosyncratic differences (say, due to consumer 
preferences for particular chains altering considerably across areas).  At a general level, Holmes (1989) 
made significant progress in setting out the issues.  He showed that equilibrium prices (not surprisingly) 
will be higher in the strong markets and lower in the weak markets.  Corts (1998) relaxed Holmes’ 
                                                     
2  On the related literature on using coupons to discriminate between groups of consumers in oligopoly, see Shaffer 
and Zhang (1995) and Bester and Petrakis (1996) on inter-store (geographic) discrimination and Besanko et al. 
(2003) on an intra-store discrimination (such as issuing customized coupons at the point of sale). 
3  All-out competition arises when each firm is under intense competitive pressure to ensure that consumers more 
favorably inclined to themselves are not taken away by rivals, while at the same time aggressively targeting (with 
low prices) consumers more favorably inclined towards rivals.  In contrast, with all-out price gouging, competitors 
are less concerned about targeting rivals’ strong markets, and more inclined to focus on securing their own “home” 
markets, with the result that competition is dampened.  See Corts (1998) and Armstrong (2005) for some 
illustrations. 
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assumption of symmetry and found that unambiguous price effects occur in some cases.  Neither Holmes 
nor Corts allowed competition, in the sense of firm numbers, to differ across markets.  Yet we commonly 
see that in the largest markets, most players are present, whilst in smaller markets, only a subset is 
represented. 
In order to provide guidance for managers in these situations, we investigate how specific market 
conditions (relating to the size and affluence of local markets and the intensity of local competition) 
influence retail oligopolists’ choice of whether or not to customize prices on a store-by-store basis and 
how this choice is likely to impact on profits.  Our framework builds on Dobson and Waterson (2005), 
which looked at the pricing choices facing a single retail chain.  However, we considerably extend this 
analysis to examine the more realistic situation where there is more than one retail chain operating in an 
economy, and where multiple retailers compete with each other on a national as well as a local basis.  
This allows us to consider a range of issues such as how each retailer views its position relative to a rival 
retail chain, whether individual and joint preferences over customizing prices differ, and whether partial 
collusion in the form of (tacit) agreement or understanding over pricing policy alters outcomes in a 
beneficial way to retailers and perhaps consumers as well. 
We show quite generally that market conditions exist where it will be both individually and 
jointly profitable for retailers to eschew customizing prices and instead set uniform prices across their 
stores.  For the individual retailer, this means forgoing high prices and high profits in the local markets 
where it has monopoly power and instead leveraging this market power across all its markets to raise 
prices in those markets where the intensity of competition otherwise makes them low.  It entails 
sacrificing some local profits, but with the benefit of softening competition more broadly sufficiently to 
raise firm profits overall.  We explore the conditions that support unilateral action in this manner.  
Although these are limited, there is considerably more scope for raising profits through uniform pricing if 
joint policy commitments are feasible (or where such pricing is required by a competition authority either 
formally through a ban on localized price discrimination or as an implicit condition to allow for other 
actions, e.g. mergers or store acquisitions from rivals4).  A surprising result is that such semi-collusion (a 
joint understanding over pricing policy, but not over individual prices) can also be in the interests of 
consumers, i.e. a genuine win-win situation.   
                                                     
4  For example, further to our discussion of UK grocery retailing in the next section and especially in the context of 
several major acquisitions that have been made by large (often national-pricing) retailers, the UK competition 
authorities have taken keen interest in even relatively small acquisitions made by retailers using local pricing.  For 
instance, the UK Competition Commission recently required the grocery retailer Somerfield, with a national market 
share of less than 6%, to divest 12 (out of 115) stores previously acquired from another grocery retailer, Morrison, 
on concerns that the former’s use of local pricing would allow it to exploit enhanced local market power to raise 
prices to consumers in the local markets served by those stores.  See Competition Commission (2005) for details.    
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Specifically, we characterize conditions that support all firms adopting uniform pricing, all firms 
customizing their prices, and a mix of the two with asymmetric choices being made (where one chain 
adopts uniform pricing while a rival chain customizes its prices even when they are in ostensibly 
symmetric situations5).  This is indeed what is found in practice.  In some sectors, customizing prices 
appears the norm,6 in others uniform pricing is common,7 and yet in others a mix is observed.   
As a prelude to our theoretical analysis, to gain further insight into the factors affecting pricing 
policy choices and the character of local retail markets we consider an example, the UK’s grocery 
retailing sector.  Until very recently this sector had an almost even split amongst the major retailers 
between those adopting local pricing and those adopting (national) uniform pricing.  Interestingly, the 
balance in the last couple of years has swung in favor of retailers adopting uniform pricing.  The 
questions arising from this case provide a key focus for our subsequent analysis and the nature of our 
theoretical model.  Following on from this, we show a general result and set out the analytical framework 
in §3 in respect of a two-stage game theoretic model where firms first select and commit to their pricing 
policy (i.e. local or uniform pricing) and then they compete by setting individual prices.  The pricing 
outcomes under each of the possible pricing policy configurations are shown in §4.  Pricing policy 
choices based on individual preferences are examined in §5.  Then, joint preferences are considered in §6. 
The impact of choices on consumer welfare is examined in §7.  We conclude by discussing the 
implications of the analysis in §8.  
 
2.  An Illustration: “Local Price Flexing” in UK Grocery Retailing 
Grocery retailing represents the largest retail sector in the UK, with annual sales of £95bn (approximately 
$170bn) in 2005.  Four retailers – Tesco, Sainsbury, Asda and Morrison/Safeway – dominate the national 
market, accounting for around 75% of sales of grocery items (i.e., food and drink, cleaning products, 
toiletries and household goods), and indeed 30% of all retail sales in the UK.8  These four supermarket 
retailers have primarily positioned themselves as “one stop shops”, operating with very wide product 
ranges in large format stores.  As such, they jointly account for nearly 95% of grocery sales for stores 
exceeding 1,400 sq meters (viewed by the UK competition authorities as the critical size distinguishing 
                                                     
5  Following Lal and Rao (1997), our results offer another insight as to why retail sectors may simultaneously 
support both EDLP and Hi-Lo pricing retailers – though, in our case the issue is about consistency of prices across 
markets, rather than over time. 
6  For example, see Thomadsen (2006) on fast food, Goldberg and Verboven (2005) on cars, and Dalkir and Warren-
Boulton (1999) on office stationery and equipment. 
7  Examples include clothing, electrical goods, and catalogue-based chain store retailers in the UK (Dobson and 
Waterson 2005). 
8  For instance, see IGD (2005) and Mintel (2005).  Tesco alone is estimated to take more than one eighth of UK 
consumer retail expenditure. 
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one-stop grocery shops, serving primary shopping needs, from smaller stores catering for “top-up” and 
“convenience” grocery shopping).   
 While most of the retail grocery chains operate on a national level in the UK, there is 
considerable variation in regional and local market shares and concentration levels.  Table 1 provides 
some summary evidence, based on a very detailed report into the sector undertaken by the UK’s 
Competition Commission (“CC” hereafter) in 2000.9  In particular, high levels of local concentration10 
were found in more rural areas11 (notably in Scotland and Wales) and certain urban areas where a 
proliferation of stores from the same chain existed12.  In addition to market structure differences, 
consumer income levels also differ from region to region (tending to be higher in the southern part of the 
UK) and from district to district (tending to be higher in urban areas as opposed to rural areas13), 
suggesting the presence of variation in local consumer demand and willingness to pay.   
With differences in both local competition and local demand conditions, it might be thought that 
retailers would seek to take advantage of opportunities to set prices differently from store to store on 
micro-marketing grounds.  In particular, retailers might set higher prices in areas where local competition 
was limited and/or average income levels were high, while setting lower prices in areas of more intense 
local competition and/or low average incomes.  However, the CC (2000) found an almost even split 
between those firms that adjusted prices on a local basis and those that adopted uniform prices across all 
their stores.  Of the fifteen main grocery chains operating in the UK, seven were found to vary prices 
from store to store based on local competition and demand conditions – a practice the CC called “local 
price flexing” – while eight used national pricing, with no local variation in prices.   
 
                                                     
9  The table shows the separate positions of Morrison and Safeway prior to their merger in March 2004. 
10  In determining the degree of local concentration and the extent of store choice facing consumers at the local level, 
the UK competition authorities have tended to examine local markets in respect of drive times between stores or 
choice in post code (zip code) areas.  For UK supermarkets, the Competition Commission (CC 2000, Appendix 6.3) 
identified that out of 1,700 stores surveyed, 175 stores were found to have a “monopoly” or “duopoly” status in local 
catchments (in respect of 10-minute drive times in urban areas and 15-minute drive times in rural areas around each 
of the stores).  However, when restricted to competition between the major “one-stop-shop” grocery retailers and 
with 10-minute drive times, then 627 out of the 1,700 stores were found to have “monopoly” or “duopoly” status. 
11  This is perhaps not surprising with rural areas being less densely populated and store replenishment being more 
difficult in remote areas (i.e. in the absence of a nearby regional distribution centre). 
12  For instance, the British media has designated a number of areas as “Tesco towns” (e.g., see “Supermarkets to 
carve up high street”, Sunday Times (London), February 19, 2006).  As market leader, Tesco presently has the 
largest market share in 67 of the 120 postal districts in the UK, having more than 40% of the market in 14 districts, 
and more than 45% in five towns (“Power of ‘big four’ revealed in new figures”, The Guardian (London), 
November 10, 2005).  At the more disaggregated postal code level, it has been reported that out of the 1,452 postal 
areas of the UK, Tesco was found to have “an almost total stranglehold” on the retail food market in 108 areas, 
while accounting for over 50% of grocery spending in a further 104 areas (“Tesco profits feed fears of a 
stranglehold”, Sunday Times (London), April 18, 2004). 
13  Even so, the range of income per capita varies considerably within both urban and rural areas.  For instance, the 
CC (2000, Appendices 13.4 and 13.5) found that for a sample of urban areas, at postcode sector level, income per 
capita ranges from as low 35% to as high as 155% of the national average. 
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Table 1.  Market Characteristics in UK Grocery Retailing, 1999 
 
National Market 
Shares 
Regional Market Shares Local Concentration  
Main UK 
grocery retailers 
 
General 
character & 
pricing policy 
 
Total 
grocery 
stores 
All 
grocery 
stores 
(%) 
Grocery 
stores 
> 1,400 sq 
m (%) 
Highest 
regional share
(12 broad UK 
regions) (%) 
Highest broad 
postcode share 
(120 narrow 
regions) (%) 
% stores in 
local monopoly
(10/15-minute 
drive time) 
% stores in local 
duopoly 
(10/15-minute 
drive time) 
One-stop shops          
Tesco Value-led Hi/Lo  642 23.0 28.5 46.5 53.6 6.0 10.3 
Sainsbury Hi/Lo 424 18.7 24.8 35.9 56.7 0.5 4.1 
Asda EDLP 227 12.2 16.8 24.8 46.8 0.0 3.1 
Safeway Hi/Lo 498 11.5 13.8 28.4 51.0 9.2 9.8 
Morrison EDLP + deals 95 3.9 5.4 21.9 45.0 0.0 4.2 
Other chains         
Somerfield /  
  Kwik Save 
Hi/Lo 
Soft Discount 1,442 9.8 3.1 17.2 30.0 NA NA 
M&S Premium 294 4.9 2.2 12.1 NA NA NA 
Waitrose Premium 119 3.0 2.5 9.0 NA NA NA 
Aldi Hard Discount 219 1.4 0.0 3.1 NA NA NA 
Lidl Hard Discount 173 0.9 0.0 2.6 NA NA NA 
Netto Hard Discount 120 0.7 0.0 2.1 NA NA NA 
Budgens Hi/Lo 177 0.7 0.0 0.9 NA NA NA 
Iceland Specialized/deals 770 3.0 0.0 0.3 NA NA NA 
Booth Premium 24 0.2 0.1 1.3 NA NA NA 
Co-operatives Hi/Lo 1,920 6.4 2.8 7.7 NA NA NA 
Source: adapted from CC (2000; Tables 5.2, 5.3, & 8.30, Appendices 5.2 & 7.1) 
 
 Table 2 shows the extent and character of local price flexing identified by the CC.  Individual 
product prices were found in some retailers to vary considerably (by as much as 100%), but average 
prices differed across each chain by less than 3%.14  The CC investigated the basis on which local pricing 
operated, identifying the critical factors influencing store-level pricing (as shown in the final column of 
Table 2).  Broadly speaking, price flexing was used by those retailers that employed promotional “Hi/Lo” 
pricing, while national pricing was used by EDLP, hard discount, and premium positioned retailers.  For 
the seven retail groups that did vary prices, both differences in local demand (in respect of income or 
regional effects) and local competition (in respect of local market power or facing particular price-focused 
competitors) were found to be important in determining the price band applied to individual stores and the 
                                                     
14  While the percentage variations might appear fairly small, the monetary sums involved can be quite significant 
given the size of the sector.  For example, the CC (2000, paragraph 7.124) found that for the largest retailer, Tesco, 
customers in its lower-price stores saved between £10.5 million and £25.9 million a year over the prices charged in 
higher-price stores. 
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variation in prices across the chain of stores.15  Cost elements (like differences in store size) were also 
found to play a role, but not so significantly as to explain the full extent of store-to-store price variation.16  
 
 
Table 2.  Local Price Flexing by UK Grocery Retailers, 1999 
 
 
Store 
Fascia 
Price-flexed 
products * 
(%) 
Widest price 
range on any 
price-flexed 
product 
Average price 
range for price-
flexed products 
(%) 
Basket price 
range across 
stores (sales 
weighted) (%) 
Identifiable 
store-level 
price bands 
(1=Uniform) 
Factors 
influencing 
store-level 
pricing †
Tesco 8.5 43.4 19.2 1.69 5 R/Y/E/D 
Sainsbury ‡ NA NA NA NA 2+ S/R/E 
Asda 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Safeway 59.5 31.0 4.3 1.09 3 M/E/D/S/R 
Morrison 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Somerfield 
Kwik Save 
23.7 
2.3 
100.0 
16.1 
6.3 
9.8 
0.20 
0.79 
10 
3 
E/S/M 
D/M 
M&S 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Waitrose 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Aldi 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Lidl 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Netto 9.9 23.5 13.7 0.001 2 R 
Budgens 64.5 62.0 9.8 3.04 5 Y/D/M 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Booth 0 0 0 0 1 - 
Co-op 33.7 57.0 6.7 0.54 4 R/S/M 
Notes:  
* Based on a basket of up to 200 common products with prices collected from up to 60 stores for each party on 
January 28, 1999 
† Store-level pricing factors identified by CC empirical analysis: R = regional effect (e.g. lower in North, higher in 
South); Y = local average income; E = local presence of EDLP retailer (Asda or Morrison); D = local presence of 
hard discount retailer (Aldi, Lidl or Netto); S = store size; M = local market share 
‡  Sainsbury did not provide the CC with the requested price data, but instead provided a complete list of stores 
that might selectively offer lower prices (with 111 of its 422 stores on a lower price tier) 
Source: adapted from CC (2000; Tables 7.2 & 7.3, Appendices 7.5 & 7.8) 
 
 
In its assessment of the practice, the CC concluded that local price flexing was anticompetitive 
and operated against the public interest when employed by the major one-stop-shop chains (i.e. Tesco, 
                                                     
15  US evidence, e.g. the findings by Hoch et al. (1995) and Chintagunta et al. (2003) in relation to Dominick’s Finer 
Foods (“DFF”) (a large supermarket chain in the Chicago area), shows that zone pricing is mostly driven by 
differences in local consumer characteristics rather than by local competition or costs. 
16  For instance, the CC undertook detailed analysis on the relative profitability of stores operated on different price 
tiers by Tesco and Sainsbury.  In both cases, the CC found that the higher prices in their higher price tier stores were 
more than was required to meeting higher operating costs, or indeed higher asset costs (CC 2000; Tables 8.31 & 
8.32, paragraphs 8.109 & 8.114). 
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Sainsbury and Safeway).17  Nevertheless, they could not identify a suitable remedy and no subsequent 
action was taken leaving retailers free to continue using the practice.18       
However, the pattern of pricing practices in the sector changed markedly over the following four 
years.  While price flexing continued to be used by some of the smaller chains, by 2003, both Sainsbury 
and Tesco had voluntarily moved away from store pricing based on location (CC 2003; paragraphs 5.36 
and 5.37).19  Furthermore, in March 2004, Morrison acquired Safeway and set about converting all the 
latter’s stores into the Morrison format, in the process abandoning Safeway’s store-by-store promotional 
pricing policy in favor of its national pricing policy.  
Remarkably, uniform pricing has become the dominant form of pricing in this sector, and the 
major retailers, at least for the time being, have eschewed the opportunity to customize prices on a store-
by-store basis in favor of national pricing.  Moreover, while commitments to national pricing may not last 
forever, they do appear fixed in the short-term, at least, given the public statements made by the 
retailers20, their moves into internet grocery retailing (based on offering identical regular on-line and off-
line prices), and marketing that is geared to national promotion of retail brands as representing consistent 
value-for-money (e.g. Tesco’s investment in its weekly-updated and very detailed price comparison 
service “Pricecheck” and the associated marketing). 
While the experience of the UK may be far from general (and here US food retailing, with local 
pricing still appearing to predominate, may stand in marked contrast21), it does raise three important 
questions that might apply to this and perhaps other retail markets as well: 
                                                     
17  On competition effects, the CC concluded that the practice “distorts competition in the retail supply of groceries 
in the UK in that it tends to focus some elements of price competition into localities where particular lower-priced 
competitors are present and away from other areas and contributes to the position that a majority of grocery products 
are not fully exposed to competitive pressure” (CC 2000, paragraph 2.406).   
18  In particular, the CC ruled out the imposition of national pricing (on grounds that this would not allow for 
differential pricing based on legitimate factors such as regional cost differences) or requiring that any price 
differences between stores should be broadly related to costs (on the grounds that this would be impractical to 
implement and regulate).   
19  However, while setting the same prices across the supermarket format, both retailers might vary prices between 
formats (i.e. between their separately branded convenience store chains as compared to their supermarket chains) – 
on the basis of operating cost differences. 
20  For instance, in the context of UK grocery retailing, Asda (owned by Wal-Mart) informed the Competition 
Commission that, in respect of charging the same prices for its products in every one of its stores, “it would be 
commercial suicide for it to move away from its highly publicized national EDLP pricing strategy and a breach of its 
relationship of trust with its customers, and it would cause damage to its brand image, which was closely associated 
with a pricing policy that assured the lowest price always” (CC 2003, paragraph 5.38).  Morrison made a similar 
point. 
21   In the US, there are signs that retailers are extending their local pricing with even finer price zones.  For 
example, Chintagunta et al. (2003) find that DFF moved from three to sixteen price zones applicable to its stores 
(between 1989 and 1992).  In other countries as well it appears that extensive zone pricing is common in grocery 
retailing, e.g. see Rondán Cataluña (2004) in relation to regional pricing in Spain. 
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• Firstly, even when retailers have the capability and wherewithal, why might some (but not 
necessarily all) of them forsake local pricing in favor of setting uniform prices applying across all 
their stores? 
• Secondly, why might there be a mutual move (rather than a unilateral move) away from local 
pricing to national pricing?  
• Thirdly, is it possible that such a general move to uniform pricing might benefit retailers and 
consumers alike? 
In this paper, we do not seek or claim to provide complete answers.  Our focus is purely on strategic 
factors relating to how competition may be altered by pricing policy choices.  We model a number of the 
observed characteristics from this case relating to oligopolistic competition in retail markets that suggest 
scope for micro-marketing.  First, we take consumers as geographically constrained and making 
purchases within distinct local markets (rather than a single, national market).22  Second, local markets 
differ in their size as well as the tastes, preferences and affluence of local consumers.  Third, local 
markets differ in terms of the composition and number of competitors operating in the area; so that, while 
retailers may be national or supra-regional chains, they operate in only some local markets (either because 
of the absence of suitable retail locations or thin markets already being well served). 
 
 
3.  Analytical Framework 
We start with a general examination of the strategic implications for adopting either a local or a uniform 
pricing policy across the stores operated by a multi-market retail chain, then move to a more specific 
model to develop further insights.  In the general setting, we show a profit motive for a retailer to choose 
deliberately not to discriminate across the local markets it serves even when these markets differ in the 
extent of demand and intensity of competition (and so would naturally appear to be candidates for 
profitable micro-marketing and price discrimination across localities).  Specifically, when a retailer is not 
a monopolist in all its local markets, strategic considerations impact the decision over whether or not to 
price discriminate because they affect the pricing decisions of other retailers, and thus market outcomes.  
We take the simplest case for illustration where a retailer operates in two local markets - in one market it 
faces no competition (i.e. a local monopoly), in the other market it faces a rival retailer (i.e. a local 
                                                     
22  This appears reasonable for many low value, everyday items like groceries, toiletries, and other fast-moving 
consumer goods (“FMCGs”), along with petrol, cigarettes and alcohol, where consumers only normally travel short 
distances in making shopping trips.  In contrast, it may not apply either to higher value shopping goods (like 
expensive electrical items and other consumer durable goods) or to goods sold mainly through direct selling routes, 
like the Internet, when this integrates local markets into a becoming a single national or even global market. 
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duopoly).  We show that demand conditions can exist, expressed in the form of a firm-level demand 
elasticity condition for the two markets, in which the retailer will find it profitable not to discriminate and 
instead set uniform prices across the local markets it serves. 
Nevertheless, while this general result and its extensions offer an existence finding, it provides 
little indication of the extent to which these conditions would apply for the retailer in practice.  We can 
say when the conditions will make uniform pricing unprofitable.  However, are the conditions under 
which it is profitable broad or limited?  To what extent do the conditions depend on differences in the 
intensity of competition across the local markets?  To answer these apposite questions we have to move 
beyond this general specification to consider specific demand forms that allow for closed-form solutions, 
enabling relevant profit and welfare comparisons to be made.   
 
3.1. Characterizing the general problem 
Firm A sells in two independent markets, 1 and 2.  Costs are the same in each market and marginal costs 
are constant.  The demand functions are continuous and downward sloping. 
We first state an obvious result, demonstrated in Holmes (1989): 
LEMMA 1. Ignoring competitive conditions, if a uniform price is to be set across the two markets, this 
price will be between the prices the firm would have set had it maximized profits by setting prices 
individually in each market. 
Now consider the following scenario.  In market 1, firm A is a monopolist whilst in market 2, a 
larger market, it faces competition from another firm (B).  Competition in the duopoly market is in prices, 
with the products of the two firms being imperfectly competitive substitutes (|∂
                                                     
qi/∂pi| > ∂qi/∂pj > 0; i, j = 
A, B; i ≠ j).  We assume that qi(pi, pj) is concave in pi, sufficient for profit to be strictly quasiconcave in pi 
(Vives 1999, p149).  The firm in question (A) has to consider whether to set uniform prices across the two 
markets, or whether to price locally.23   
 
PROPOSITION 1. In the scenario outlined above, there is a range of demand parameters for which there is 
some profit incentive for firm A to set a uniform price across the two markets rather than pricing markets 
separately.  The incentive arises when demand facing A is no less elastic in the duopoly market than in 
the monopoly market. 
 
23 Note that this is a different issue from that considered by Holmes (1989), who did not allow the number of firms 
to differ across markets. 
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Consider the maximization problem for firm A, assuming its sets prices separately in each market.  
Its profits are 
)),()(.(),()(),()( 22211222211122211 BABAAABAAA ppqpqcppqppqpppp +−+=π+π≡π
The first order conditions, succinctly written, are 
1 2
1 2
0 (A
Ap p
π π∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ 1)
In the second condition for equality in (1) above, maximization is done assuming pB2 fixed.  Call the 
prices thereby set p*1   and p
*
A  2   respectively.  
On the other hand, if firm A decides to practice uniform pricing, its profits are 
The firs
since firm A recognizes the full im
),()( 221 BAAAA ppp π+π≡π
t order condition is now 
1 2 2 2
2
0 (2)A A A B
A A A B A
d dp
dp p p p dp
π π π π∂ ∂ ∂= + + ⋅ =∂ ∂ ∂
pact of its price choice.  Call the optimal uniform price *up . The 
second order condition for maximization under uniform pricing is d2πA(p*u  , . )/dp2A     < 0.   
Take the case where p p> .  Turning to the final term in (2), note that since ∂qA2/∂pB2 > 0, 
it follows that ∂π ( . )/∂p  > 0.  Furthermore, dp /dp  > 0 since the products are strategic complements 
in market 2 by assumption.  At p  we have 
Therefore, there exists a 
1 2A* *
A2 B2 B2 A
2A *
)3(.)()((
2
2
2
*
22
2
*
22
2
2
A
B
B
AA
A
A
A
A
dp
dp
p
p
p
p
dp ∂
π∂+∂
π )* 2 AApd π∂≡
price 2 *      ( 0)Ap ε ε+ >  at which 2 2 2( * ) ( *)A A Ap pπ ε π+ > .  Thus, if 2 *Ap  and 
1 *p  are sufficiently close (specifically mete, demand para rs are such that 1 *p  is less than the m mum axi
value of 2 *Ap ε+ ) profits are h form pricing  a range of parameter 
es for firm A under which profits earned under uniform pricing are greater (no less) than those earned 
by setting dividually in each market.  
By Lemma 1, this range involves underlying parameter values in which the monopoly price set 
individually would be higher (no lower) than 
igher under uni .  Hence, th ists
valu
 price in
the duopoly price set individually, rather than the other way 
around.                                                    Q.E.D. 
 
ere ex
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The intuition for this result is fairly clear.  Given equal market demand elasticities, a firm will 
want to set a lower price in the duopoly market than in the monopoly market.  But competitive 
considerations cannot be ignored.  The actions of the two firms are strategic complements, i.e. for firm A: 
where R
meaning that B
terminology of Bulow et al. (1985), 
 
setting a high price in the duopoly market, and as a 
nce result.  Whilst uniform pricing will not be 
to our firms in market 2,24 he shows that 
he 
products are substitutes, this is positive. Then, putting (5) and (6) together, it is necessary that  
                                                     
B is firm B’s reaction function. 
 Thus if firm A sets a low price in market 2, this makes A a relatively fierce competitor for B, 
uniform pricing strategy, thereby raising price in market 2, firm A loses some potential profit in the
 would want to reduce its price (through the equivalent of equation (4)) for good 2.  In the 
investment in reducing price makes firm A “tough”.  By choosing a 
monopolized market.  However by being “soft” in 
result inducing firm B to set a higher price in market 2, A gains more profit in the duopoly market than it 
would do otherwise and hence may benefit in net terms. 
 On the other hand, if demand facing A in the duopoly market is relatively less elastic than demand 
in the monopoly market, setting a uniform price across both markets would imply reducing price in the 
duopoly market below the price based on elasticity in that market alone.  This would toughen 
competition, something clearly not in A’s interest.   
It is clear that Proposition 1 relates to an existe
profitable should market demand in the monopoly market be less elastic than in the duopoly market, it 
may but need not be profitable where market demand in the monopoly market is more elastic.  In order to 
characterize this latter situation somewhat more fully without descending immediately to specific 
parameteric cases, we consider two general issues. 
Call the price that the firms would set in market 2 if acting together, P2*.  From Proposition 1, it 
is evident from (2) that for uniform pricing to be profitable, 2 1 2* * *AP p p> > .  Hence it must be that  
where the η’s are price elasticities of demand, superscript I referring to the industry, F to the firm.  
Utilising a result due to Holmes (1989) that applies 
where the C superscript shows a cross-elasticity of demand between the two firms’ products.  Since t
24 It does not apply in market 1. 
)4(0)),(( >∂∂
π∂
AAB
A ppR
pp
)()()( *2
*
1
*
u
I
u
I
u
C pηpηpη −>
2
BA
)5()()()( *2
*
1
*
2 u
F
u
I
u
I pηpηpη <<
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In other words, the products 
Moreover, it is clear from (5
must be sufficiently dissimilar, although recall we have already 
noted that they must not be too dissimilar!  Uniform pricing, then, only becomes profitable over a limited 
parameter range. 
) that market 2 must not be a “simple magnification” of market 1.  By 
this, we refer to the pattern of individual willingnesses to pay across markets.  Assume that there is a 
distribution of willingness to pay across consumers, f(p), with support [0, p ] in market 1 such that each 
consumer represented will purchase one unit if price is below their p value, zero otherwise.  Therefore, 
demand in market 1 at a given out
whence 
put level q%  will be given by 
)7()~()().(~ pFpFdppfq
p
−=≡
~p
∫
( ) ( )dq p dp f p= −% % . 
We define a simple magnification as willingness to pay in market 2 being (1 ) ( ) ,    >0f pθ θ+ .  
It then becomes apparent through simple substitution that ( ) ( )I Ip pη η=% % , violating condition (5) for 
uniform pricing to be profitable.  We have the following remark on Proposition 1: 
1 2
REMARK 1: The range of demand parameters under which there is an incentive for uniform 
pricing does not include cases wher
The meaning of a simple m
ber of consumers.  Their distribution of tastes across the population remains unchanged.25 
Howeve o that there are som
aller market. 
of products, not simply 
stocking the products in 
agnification 
of the smaller market.  This occurs when the distribution of willingness to pay in market 1 is
e market 2 is a simple magnification of market 1. 
agnification is that the only difference between the two markets lies in 
the num
r, we take the view that in larger markets it is the case that tastes spread, s e 
“high end” consumers in a large market not represented in a sm  Prima facie evidence for this 
is that larger outlets of retailers such as supermarkets tend to have broader ranges 
greater depth. 
We define an alternative expansion where the larger market is a “taste-expanding” m
 ( )f p  with 
support [0, 1p ], whilst the distribution of willingness to pay in market 2 is (1 ) ( . )     0, >1f pθ γ θ γ+ ≥  
with support [ ]10, )p γ .  Here, simple manipulations of the elasticity formula show that there is at least a 
                                                     
25 This is an assumption made for example in Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) in relation to small towns in the Midwest 
of the US.  In terms of a linear demand function, demand in market 2 would have the same intercept but a shallower 
slope than in market 1 under a simple magnification. 
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region of demand where market demand elasticity in market 2 is less than in market 1.26 Note that the 
formula for elasticity of demand in market 2 (after slight simplification) is 
2
( )( )
( ) ( )
I pf pp
F p F p
γη γ γ= −
% %% %  
Accordingly there is a natural tendency for the denominator to be larger tha  
price.  On this e conclude the following: 
REMARK 2: Where market 2 is a “taste-expanding” magnification of market 1, there is a clear 
potential for uniform pricing to be profitable. 
, n that for market 1 at any
 basis, w
We assert that a taste-expanding magnification is likely to be the norm, because it may be thought 
of as demand having some (positive) cross-sectional elasticity with respect to income, say, whilst a taste-
rm pricing requires some form of commitment to be 
credible
itment in order to avoid a “cheap talk” problem where the 
rival does not believe that the firm will stick to a uniform pricing policy when it comes to setting 
individu
 national 
pricing.
monopoly market, the firm will find it profitable to practice uniform pricing.  How significant is this?  In 
                                                     
contracting magnification is a rather unlikely occurrence, akin to an inferior good.27  
Finally, we should point out that unifo
.  Specifically, for uniform pricing to influence the rival’s pricing behavior in the desired manner, 
it must be through a visible, irreversible comm
al prices.  We have already mentioned some aspects of the current commitments given by the 
leading UK supermarkets groups to uniform pricing.  In addition, Dobson and Waterson (2005) discuss 
more general examples of the forms of commitment that a retail chain may make to uniform
  These include making an expensive commitment that would render its position worse were it not 
to adopt uniform pricing than it if did so – such as publishing all prices in a catalogue which then applies 
across the whole country, using national advertising to inform consumers about prices, or using integral 
price tags standard across a country.  Also, Corts (1998) cites the required commitment of retailers 
pursuing strategies based on providing “every day low prices”, where price consistency across markets 
and over time is a critical feature.  
 
  
3.2. A Specific Framework 
Proposition 1 demonstrates that for certain parameter ranges in which demand elasticity facing the firm in 
the duopoly market is no less than, but market elasticity is lower than, the elasticity it faces in the 
26 Again referring to the linear example, if 1γ > , 0θ =   then we have demand in market 2 being parallel to but 
above demand in market 1. In that case, demand is less elastic at any price (up to p ) in market 2. 
27 Taste contraction would imply not that there were relatively few high end customers in a larger market, but rather 
that there is an absence of high end customers who are present in a small market but not in a large one. 
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order to identify the extent of this force, we move to a specific modeling framework; we choose a linear 
demand structure.  Within this structure, we adopt a straightforward parameterization in which the various 
rces exhibited in equation (2) are represented.  We extend the analysis to the case where both firms A 
egic pricing decisions through a framework in which there are two identical markets like 
ne market of type 2.  To adapt the terminology in a memorable way, we 
the practical 
observa
metric positions.  Specifically, whilst 
the com
                                                     
fo
and B make strat
market 1 above, together with o
call the market where only firm A operates market “A1”, the market where only firm B operates market 
“B1” and the market where both operate, market “2”. 
Thus we represent the country as consisting of just three separate local markets.  Both retailers 
operate in the “high-demand” market that supports both firms, for example a large/affluent city.  In each 
of the other two (“low-demand”) markets, only one of the retailers operates.  Here, the two local 
monopoly markets can be thought of as smaller, less affluent towns or rural areas where opportunities for 
opening stores are greatly restricted either by tight planning rules or the paucity of demand relative to 
fixed set up costs.28  Consumers purchase only in their own market. 
Of course, this oversimplifies the differences in demand and competition conditions that are 
likely to exist between real local markets.  However, this bifurcation of markets encapsulates 
tion that local markets differ in both the extent of demand (e.g. where population sizes, as well as 
consumer tastes and incomes, vary from one region to another) and the number of players operating.  In 
particular, it captures the general fact that while retail chains may operate right across a geographical 
entity, they do not commonly operate in every local market, facing competitors in some locations but not 
others. 
 To ease exposition, we assume that the two firms are in sym
peting retail services are different, each chain has no cost or demand advantage over its rival.29  
Hence the two “monopoly” markets are assumed to be identical, while in the “duopoly” market the firms 
face symmetric demand for their respective differentiated retail offerings.  We incorporate variations in 
the extent of consumer demand across the two market types by allowing the demand intercept term (α)  to 
be lower in each of the two monopoly markets than in the duopoly market whilst differentiation between 
the firms is captured by a parameter γ. 
28  See Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) for some general empirical support, in the context of US retail markets, for the 
assumption that entry conditions vary across local markets.  In the case of UK grocery retailing, very tight planning 
restrictions for large superstore and hypermarket developments pose a major barrier to entry and expansion (CC 
to the effect of cost and demand asymmetries, see Dobson and Waterson (2005). 
2000; Chapter 12). 
29 It is possible to extend our framework to consider the firms in asymmetric positions, e.g., by having the firms 
operate in different numbers of markets.  However, this adds a good deal to the complexity but little to the insights 
offered.  In relation 
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 Firms are assumed fully aware of each other’s cost and demand, as well as their own respective 
positions.  Armed with this information, firms compete through setting prices having made their choices 
of pricing policy (i.e. whether they have each decided to adopt local or uniform pricing).     
 We use a simple linear demand specification that allows us to compute and compare outcomes, 
yet enables us to develop intuitions regarding the impact of differences in demand and the intensity of 
competition between the local markets.30  An added benefit of this approach, especially in view of the 
complexity of the equations, is that all the results can be neatly portrayed in a simple diagrammatic form. 
 
rmali
    pA2(qA2,qB2) = 1 – qA2 – γqB2              (8a) 
  (8b) 
      pA1(qA1)  =  α – qA1                 (8c) 
 Consumer preferences in each of the two market types are represented by a standard quadratic 
utility function in respect of purchasing a composite good.31  In the case of the duopoly market, the utility 
function for the representative consumer takes the form 
V2(qA2,qB2) = qA2 + qB2 – (qA22 + 2γqA2qB2+ qB22)/2 + z2
where qA2 and qB2 respectively represent the quantity supplied by each retail chain for market 2, while γ ∈ 
[0,1) captures the consumer’s perception of the substitutability between the retailers’ services and product 
offering (becoming closer substitutes as γ → 1), and z2 represents all other goods and has a price
no zed to unity.  The consumer’s budget constraint is taken as m2 = pA2qA2 + pB2qB2 + z2. 
 In the monopoly market controlled by firm A, given the absence of variety, the utility function 
takes the form for market A1: 
VA1(qA1) =  αqA1 – (qA12)/2 + zA1             α ∈ (0,1] 
Here, the consumer’s budget constraint is mA1 = pA1qA1 + zA1. Similarly, for the monopoly market 
controlled by firm B, the utility function for market B1 is 
VB1(qB1) =  αqB1 – (qB12)/2 + zB1             α ∈ (0,1] 
The analogous budget constraint is mB1 = pB1qB1 + zB1. 
  Constrained optimization of the utility functions reveals indirect demand in each market as 
       
       pB2(qB2,qA2) = 1 – qB2 – γqA2               
      pB1(qB1)  =  α – qB1                 (8d) 
                                                     
30  In particular, we adopt a representative consumer perspective (along the lines of Bowley (1924), Dixit (1979) and 
Singh and Vives (1984)), that allows firm-level and market-level demand to be subject to both own-price and cross-
price effects, rather than use considerably more complex discrete choice or location models (e.g., multinomial logit 
or Hotelling with variable demand) that provide similar demand and competition features (Anderson et al. 1992). 
31 This “good” could be thought of as either an individual good with a specific amount of retail service attached or 
more appropriately in the case of multi-line retailers a composite basket of goods.  Clearly, in practice, retailers may 
operate with multiple lines and micro-marketing techniques may then be applied to price each of these individually 
across stores.  Instead, our simplifying assumption can be thought as determining general store-level price bands 
applying across the range of goods. 
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Solving
)/( 1 – γ2)              (9a)  
            qB2( (9b) 
              (9c) 
(9d) 
Thus the two critical param a considerable bearing on our
α and γ. The former captures in monopol
consumer demand may be less, in respect of ers’ willingness to pay and the scale 
emand, than in the “larger” duop becoming greater the closer α is to 
irst term.  Parameter γ allows for different intensities 
f price competiti absence of competition in
onopoly market
rm in (2).  In fact, in deve
Equilibrium outcomes wo-stage game.  In the first stage, 
retailer 
                                                     
 for the direct demand functions reveals 
            qA2(pA2,pB2) = (1 – γ –  pA2 + γpB2
pA2,pB2) = (1 – γ –  pB2 + γpA2)/( 1 – γ2)             
            qA1(pA1)  =  α – pA1   
            qB1(pB1)  =  α – pB1                 
eters of our framework, which have  
results, are a simple way the notion that in the “smaller” y 
markets  both consum of 
d oly market, with the difference zero.  
In terms of equation (2) above, it impacts upon the f
o on in the duopoly market with which to compare the  the 
m s, with the difference becoming greater the closer γ is to unity.  It relates to the final 
te loping our intuition, we focus on the role of γ. 
  for the retailers are modeled as a t each 
decides its pricing policy – whether to practice local (L) or uniform (U) pricing.  In the second 
stage, the firms simultaneously determine their prices, being aware of each other’s first-stage decision.  
The equilibrium concept is sub-game perfection.  The outcomes from the second stage are considered in 
the next section, examining in turn each of the four possible pricing policy configurations that might arise 
depending on each retailer’s choice over whether to use local pricing or uniform national pricing.32  
Section 5 then considers the outcomes from the first stage, where the retailers individually choose (and 
commit to) their pricing policy.   
 
4.  Pricing Outcomes 
We begin by solving for outcomes when both retail chains adopt local pricing before considering the 
situation where they both adopt uniform pricing, followed by the asymmetric situation where one adopts 
local pricing while the other adopts uniform pricing. 
 
32  The decision over pricing strategy is modeled as a dichotomous choice between setting individual prices purely 
according to local conditions or setting a single price to cover all markets served.  Conceivably, though, a retailer 
might have mixed interests, such as using a “half-way-house” strategy of setting prices partly according to 
individual market conditions and partly according to average conditions across all markets served.  We limit 
attention here to the dichotomous choice in view of the commitment requirements that, in order to be effective, 
competition-softening pricing strategies must be visible and irreversible.   
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4.1. Local Pricing by Both Retailers – (L,L) 
When both retailers adopt local pricing, each retailer sets a price for each local market to maximize profit 
 that local market.  First, consider firm A’s situation.  With zero operating costs, its profit function in its 
qA1.  Substituting in the expression for demand, (9c), optimizing with respect 
on is 
ponse function in the contested market is 
Then, from (9
Combined profits for each retail cal pricing are thus 
 
With both retailers adopting uniform
profits.  For firm A, this is 
Rearrangeme
he analogou
)10()1/()1(),( 222222222 γ−γ+−γ−==π BAABAAAA pppppqp
)13()2/()1(22 γ−γ−== BA pp
)14(
)15(
in
monopoly market is πA1 = pA1
to pA1 and solving yields the monopoly price as p
L
A
L
1 = α/2, quantity as qLAL1 = α/2 and local market profit as 
πLA
L
1 = α2/4.  Identical results hold for firm B in respect of its monopoly market. 
 In the contested market, firm A’s profit functi
On optimizing with respect to pA2, firm A’s best-res
pA2(pB2) = (1 − γ + γpB2)/2                     (11) 
Similarly for firm B, we can analogously derive its best-response function in the market as 
pB2(pA2) = (1 − γ + γpA2)/2                   (12) 
Using (9) and (10), we can solve for the pair of local pricing equilibrium prices 
LLLL
a), (9b), (10) and (13), the quantities sold by each retailer and their respective profit levels 
in the contested market are: 
])2)(1/[()1(;)]2)(1/[(1 22222 γ−γ+γ−=π=πγ−γ+== LLBLLALLBLLA qq
er across both its markets under lo
)4/(])2)(1/[()1( 22 α+γ−γ+γ−=Π=Π LLBLLA
4.2. Uniform Pricing by Both Retailers - (U,U) 
 pricing, each of them sets a single price to maximize its combined 
(16))()() 212 ⎟⎟⎠⎜
⎜
⎝ −α+γ−=+= A
BA
AAAA ppqqp 1
)1(,(
⎞⎛ γ+−γ−Π BAA pppp
nt of the FOC shows that the best-response function for chain A in this case is 
(17)
2 22 ⎟⎠⎜⎝ γ−BA
))1(1)(1()( 1 ⎟⎞⎜⎛ γ+γ+α+γ−= Bppp
T s best-response function for chain B is 
(18)
2
))1(1)(1(⎛ α+γ−)( 221 ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝ γ−
γ+γ+= AAB ppp
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Using (17) and (18) to solve for the pair of equilibrium prices reveals 
Using (9), the quantity sold by each firm in each market is 
We assume that the conditi
retailers would withdraw from
market (if they could not pr
 
4.3. Uniform Pricing by One Firm a
We can also calculate
ts 
 relation to the contested market, where it faces competition from retailer B, is 
presented by (11).  In contrast, firm B’s best-response function is given by (18).  Solving for the 
equilibrium prices shows 
The individual equilibrium quantities are 
on specified in (20a) holds, noting that it is sufficient for α > 1/3; otherwise the 
 the (small) monopoly markets to concentrate on the (much larger) duopoly 
ice discriminate).  On the basis of this condition being satisfied, total profits 
for each retailer are then 
nd Local Pricing by the Other – (L,U) and (U,L) 
 magnitudes in the situation where firm A, say, sets local prices while firm B sets a 
uniform price applicable to both of its stores (observing that these roles can be reversed without affecting 
the overall analysis).  Here, firm A sets the local monopoly price (α/2) in its monopoly market while i
best-response function in
re
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]24)[1( 22γ−γ−γ+BA
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)c23(
)2(3
)2)(1(if0
58
)2)(1()2(3
22
2
1 γ−
γ+γ−>α>γ−
γ+γ−−γ−α=LUBq
)d23(
)58)(1( 22 γ−γ+B
Again, we assume
sufficient for α > 1/3 to ensure that the condition in (23c) holds.  On this basis, total profits for each 
retailer are then 
 
aving identified the outcomes under each of the four possible pricing policy combinations, we now 
irm’s preferences according to the different 
ocal pricing 
 that the monopoly markets not so small as to rule out profitable supply, noting it is 
20 
5.  Individual Preferences over Pricing Policy 
H
compare the profits for each firm in order to determine each f
possible demand and competitive conditions.  Here, it will prove convenient to refer to the l
equilibrium price in each monopoly market as pm (≡ 1LLAp  = 1LLBp  = α/2) and the corresponding price in the 
duopoly market as pd (≡ 2LLAp  = 2LLBp  = (1–γ)/(2–γ)).  In addition, three identities labeled as Z1, Z2 and Z3 
(each defined below) are useful in establishing propositions relating to comparisons over the retailers’ 
profits.  
We need to consi two  profit comparisons.  The first is between the firm locally pricing and 
uniformly pricing when its rival is locally pricing.  The second is between the firm locally pricing and 
uniformly
der  key
 pricing when its rival is uniformly pricing.  Together, the two profit comparisons allow us to 
determine the preference for each firm given the position of its rival, and so identify the (sub-game 
perfect) equilibrium choice of pricing policy for a given set of market conditions (i.e. as determined by 
the parameter values taken by α and γ).  We will focus on the profit comparisons regarding firm A, 
bearing in mind that the profit comparisons for firm B are directly analogous.   
 In respect of the first comparison, taking the difference between the relevant expressions from 
(15) and (25) (adapted for retailer A) and rearranging reveals: 
(1)[4EhC Mπγ γ= ∀+− +−
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The denominator in (26) is clearly positive, and thus the sign of the expression hinges on the sign 
of the other two terms in square brackets.  Here, we can establish that these two terms can be positive or 
negative and that the signs do not necessarily coincide. Therefore, when its rival prices locally, each 
retailer may under particular market conditions (i.e. given certain values of α and γ) have a strict 
preference for uniform pricing over local pricing.  This finding is formalized in the following 
proposition:33
 
PROPOSITION 2. For α ∈ (0,1) the zone in (α,γ) space for which a retailer prefers uniform pricing when 
its rival is locally pricing has two boundaries.  The first boundary is given by the condition that the 
monopoly market price is equal to the duopoly market price, i.e. pm = pd. The other boundary is pm = 
pdZ1, where Z1 ≡ X1/Y1, and this lies above (i.e. outside) the first in (α,γ) space. 
 
The second relevant profit comparison for each firm is between local and uniform pricing when 
its rival is uniform pricing.  For firm A, this is the difference between (24) and (21).  Upon rearrangement 
this yields the following expression: 
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As with the previous profit comparison, (26), the sign of the expression in (27) hinges on the sign of the 
other two numerator terms in square brackets, which can be positive or negative.  As before, preference 
exists for uniform pricing over local pricing: 
 
PROPOSITION 3. For α ∈ (0,1) the zone in (α,γ) space for which a retailer prefers uniform pricing when 
its rival is uniform pricing has two boundaries.  The first boundary is given by the condition that the 
monopoly market price is equal to the duopoly market price, i.e. pm = pd.  The other boundary is pm = 
pdZ2, where Z2 ≡ X2/Y2, and this lies above (i.e. outside) the first in (α,γ) space. 
 
                                                     
33  Proofs for this and all subsequent propositions are contained in the Appendix.   
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Ostensibly, the zones supporting individual preferences for uniform or local pricing appear very 
similar.  In particular, Propositions 2 and 3 taken together establish that a firm may have an individual 
preference for uniform pricing regardless of its rival’s choice for certain values of α and γ.  In addition 
though, comparing the boundary conditions from the two profit comparisons, represented by (25) and 
(26), allows us to establish the following important result: 
 
PROPOSITION 4.  The scope for (individually) preferring uniform pricing is greater when the rival chain 
retailer is using local pricing rather than uniform pricing. 
 
To put some color on these results, recall from Lemma 1 the averaging effect that uniform pricing 
offers in comparison to local pricing.  If a firm were a monopolist in each of its markets, it could use local 
pricing to exploit differences in local demand levels and earn the local monopoly profit in each instance.  
If instead the monopolist decided to use a uniform price, it would in effect be raising the price in its low-
demand markets while cutting the price in its high-demand markets.  Because it would have already been 
maximizing its profits in every possible instance, such a move would be expected to reduce its profits in 
each of its markets.  This is borne out in the present setting when γ = 0, where the retailers’ services are 
viewed as demand independent in the duopoly market.  Then, as evident from (26) and (27), regardless of 
the choice made by its rival, each firm’s profit would always be higher under local pricing so long as 
there was a difference in demand levels to exploit (i.e. for α < 1). 
 In contrast, when the firms’ products are competitors in the same market, a strategic motive may 
exist for adopting uniform pricing.  Specifically, a firm may be willing to sacrifice its freedom to price 
discriminate, thereby losing some profits in one market, if it can be compensated by higher profits in 
another market.  This becomes possible if a visible, irreversible commitment to uniform pricing 
influences the behavior of a rival so as to dampen the competition between them when they compete in 
the same market (e.g. along the commitment means discussed at the end of section 3.1 above).  Thus, if 
the firm could commit to a uniform pricing policy that would entail it setting a higher price, it could 
induce a rival competing in the same market also to raise its price.  However, while the softened 
competition might raise profits in that market, this could only come about from a lower price in the 
monopoly market that would reduce its profit there.   
 So what market conditions are most likely to justify making a commitment to uniform pricing?  
We already know that uniform pricing would never be profitable if pm < pd.  Furthermore, we can note 
that this condition applies to a wide range of parameter space, notably when α and γ take on low values, 
given that the boundary condition pm = pd (i.e., α = 2(1–γ)/(2–γ)) is downward sloping and concave to the 
origin in (α,γ) space, ranging from co-ordinates (1,0) towards (0,1).   
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In the region where pm > pd, the averaging effect would mean lowering the monopoly price but 
raising the duopoly price.  However, the greater the relative gap between A’s (higher) monopoly-market 
price and its (lower) duopoly-market price when it uses local pricing, the less inclined A will be to make 
this sacrifice by adopting uniform pricing.  To see this, note that such a price gap is particularly 
pronounced when α and γ both take on high values. Similarly, the gap in profits made in the two markets 
will be pronounced.  In this case, to soften competition in the duopoly market, in order for it to earn 
higher profits there, firm A would need to commit to raising its price considerably to induce B to respond 
by raising its price significantly.  This becomes less likely the higher is the value of γ, since the more 
substitutable the services are perceived to be, the less B would need to raise its price in order to increase 
its own profits as it could simply use the price differential to attract significantly more demand (at the 
other retailer’s expense).    
In other words, when γ is high, all that a commitment to uniform pricing would do is to provide 
its local-pricing rival B with a “pricing umbrella” under which it could set a lower price so as to take 
custom away from A to its own benefit, with little or nothing gained by A in making the uniform-pricing 
commitment.  Thus, if A can earn high profits from its monopoly market by local pricing, it would be 
better off not sacrificing these to try to dampen competition in what is naturally an intensely competitive 
duopoly market.  The larger the monopoly market relative to the duopoly market, the greater this force is 
likely to be. 
 This tendency for high values of α and γ to limit the scope for a firm being prepared to adopt 
uniform pricing applies regardless of whether the rival adopts local or uniform pricing.  This explains the 
outer boundaries relating to both Proposition 2 and 3.  However, these effects are somewhat tempered if 
the rival is adopting uniform pricing since here the firm is aware that its rival is also prepared to commit 
to a higher price in the duopoly.  This explains the finding expressed in Proposition 4.  By the same token, 
the desire to free ride on a rival’s commitment to uniform pricing will be stronger the greater the 
monopoly-profit sacrifice that would be needed if it were to make a similar commitment.  Accordingly, 
with independent choices of pricing policy we should expect the scope for committing to uniform pricing, 
in the absence of being sure that the rival is likely to match this commitment, as a further limiting factor 
in support of uniform pricing.   
 All of this suggests that uniform pricing is only likely to arise as an independent commitment 
when competition in the duopoly can be suitably softened without too much of a drop in the monopoly-
market price (e.g. when pm is only slightly above pd) and when the tendency to free ride is small as a 
consequence of a similar need and ability to dampen competition suitably (e.g. for mid-high values of 
both α and γ). 
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Nevertheless, an important corollary of Propositions 2-4 is that market conditions exist which 
separately support all three possible pricing configurations, i.e. the two symmetric configurations where 
both adopt uniform pricing or both adopt local pricing, along with the asymmetric configuration where 
one adopts uniform pricing and the other adopts local pricing.  The equilibrium pricing configurations that 
emerge from this analysis are illustrated in Figure 1, showing the preferences of the firms in (α,γ) space.  
Here, we have three distinct, non-crossing boundaries, shown as solid lines, dividing (α,γ) space into four 
zones.  The symmetry assumption means that the same preference structure holds for both firms, so that 
the diagram is identical whether we are considering firm A or firm B.   
 
- Figure 1 near here - 
 
The equilibrium pricing-strategy choices follow directly from the position of the three boundary 
lines.  Both retailers prefer adopting local pricing below the lower boundary, where pm < pd, and above the 
upper boundary, where pm > pdZ1, hence the outcome (L,L) in these two zones.34 Between these two 
boundary lines, we have two zones separated by a middle boundary line, pm = pdZ2. In the lower of these 
two zones, that is where pm > pd and both pm < pdZ1 and pm < pdZ2, then both firms would individually 
prefer to commit to uniform pricing, irrespective of the rival’s choice, as this offers each of them higher 
profits than locally pricing, hence the outcome (U,U). However, in the upper of these two zones, where pm 
> pd and pm < pdZ1 but pm > pdZ2, each retailer is better off doing the opposite of its rival. In other words, 
we have an asymmetric (sub-game perfect) equilibrium zone where one firm would prefer committing to 
uniform pricing if the other firm locally priced, but it would prefer locally pricing if the other firm 
committed to uniform pricing, i.e. (U,L) or equivalently (L,U) applies. Nevertheless, in this “chicken 
game” situation, each firm would prefer its rival to adopt uniform pricing while it adopted local pricing.  
 The implication is that in the asymmetric equilibrium zone there is likely to be a co-ordination 
problem (with each retailer preferring local pricing while its rival uniformly prices) when the firms 
simultaneously make their choice over pricing policy.  The only escape from this (at least in pure strategy 
terms) is for one of the firms to commit both credibly and visibly to its pricing policy in advance of its 
rival; a change in the underlying game.  In this case there would be a first-mover advantage from 
committing to local pricing, leaving the rival to commit to uniform pricing.  In the absence of sequential 
commitments though, the co-ordination problem points to each firm adopting a mixed strategy, as usual in 
such “chicken” circumstances. 
                                                     
34  As can be observed, the conditions for non-negative quantities in the monopoly markets under uniform pricing 
are therefore not relevant as the respective boundary lines (qUA
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1 = 0) lie below the pm = pd  
boundary line and local pricing is always preferred to uniform pricing in these circumstances. 
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6. Joint Preferences over Pricing Policy 
Whilst there is scope for a firm independently to commit profitably to uniform pricing, the free-rider 
problem associated with independent choices restricts this prospect, since a firm making this commitment 
effectively provides an attractive pricing umbrella for its rival.  Therefore it is possible for the firms to be 
caught in a prisoners’ dilemma, with each preferring the other to commit to uniform pricing but each not 
prepared itself to commit to such a policy, even though both of them could be better off if they both made 
such a commitment.  Clearly, this is only likely to apply to certain market circumstances.   
 Nevertheless, at the margin, it is possible that joint preferences allow for greater scope in favor of 
uniform pricing (i.e. as long as α and γ are not “too high”).  The above intuition is supported by a 
comparison between the firms’ joint profits when they both use local pricing as opposed to when they 
both use uniform pricing.  Using (15) and (21), the difference between the combined profits of firms A 
and B when they both use local pricing compared to when they both use uniform pricing is: 
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Using this comparison, we can establish the following proposition concerning joint preferences for both 
retailers adopting uniform pricing as opposed to both adopting local pricing:  
 
PROPOSITION 5. For α ∈ (0,1), a zone exists in (α,γ) space for which the retailers jointly prefer mutual 
uniform pricing over mutual local pricing, as defined by two non-overlapping boundaries, the inner one 
in (α,γ) space being pm = pd and the outer one being pm = pdZ3, where Z3 ≡ X3/Y3. Furthermore, this 
upper/outer boundary lies above the two upper boundaries for private preferences towards uniform 
pricing as established in Propositions 2 and 3. 
 
Proposition 5 shows that if joint agreement on a common pricing policy were possible then this extends 
the range over which uniform pricing would be chosen compared to when firms had to make unilateral 
commitments.  Figure 2 illustrates the result, where the outer boundary for joint preferences over uniform 
pricing, indicated by pm = pdZ3, lies above and to the right of the private preference outer boundaries, 
respectively pm = pdZ1 and pm = pdZ2, shown as dashed lines. The area where uniform pricing is jointly 
preferred, labeled (U*,U*), extends particularly to higher values of α, as well as higher values of γ.  
Correspondingly, the upper zone where local pricing is jointly preferred, i.e. the upper (L*,L*) zone in 
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Figure 2, is considerably smaller in size than the equivalent area in Figure 1 where symmetric local 
pricing emerges under individual preferences.  
 
- Figure 2 near here - 
 
Accordingly, we can see that circumstances might arise where it would be in the joint interest of 
the firms to determine a common policy of uniform pricing.35 However, this still begs the question of how 
in practice they could secure this outcome and overcome the prisoners’ dilemma nature of the situation.   
Indeed, the situation could be viewed as “partial collusion”, in the sense of the firms agreeing 
over a pricing policy but not individual prices.  In a related context involving collusion over relative 
prices, Winter (1997) cites situations where firms have made formal agreements to limit the extent to 
which they price discriminate between different groups of consumers (distinguished by their price 
sensitivity), in relation to discounts offered through coupons.  He argues there may be practical reasons 
that support this form of partial collusion, since it is likely to be easier to observe and monitor each 
other’s general pricing policy than to monitor individual prices when each stocks several thousand 
product lines.  However, in the event that legally binding agreements of this type are not permitted (and 
all the agreements that Winter cites have been struck down by the courts on price-fixing grounds), firms 
would have to resort to tacit collusion.   
An alternative means of achieving the same outcome would be for the firms to be jointly obliged 
to set uniform prices by an outside body.36  For instance, a competition authority which required the 
retailers not to price discriminate and instead to offer uniform prices could, perhaps unwittingly, allow the 
firms to achieve this outcome when the firms could not achieve this by themselves.  Indeed, it is possible 
that even a signal (or veiled threat) from a competition authority, that it was unhappy with third-degree 
price discrimination being practiced against geographically constrained consumers, might provide the 
necessary impetus for firms collectively to adopt uniform pricing.37
                                                     
35  There are, of course, two other profit comparisons, namely between the asymmetric case and each of the two 
symmetric cases.  Analysis of these shows that there is no zone in (α,γ) space in which joint profits in the 
asymmetric case are greater than in both symmetric cases.  Details are available upon request. 
36  Producers supplying the retailers are unlikely to be able to achieve this (even if they wanted to and had the power 
over retailers to make them comply) since such a move would likely be regarded as an attempt to set or influence 
resale prices, which in most countries might be regarded as illegal if it were viewed as amounting to resale price 
maintenance.  See Chen (1999) for a full analysis and Office of Fair Trading (2003) for a particular case.   
37 In this context, the requirement for the major UK supermarket retailers to set uniform national prices was 
considered but rejected by the Competition Commission in 2000.  However, by designating local price flexing as 
anticompetitive and against the public interest, there has been a subsequent change in the stance by those retailers 
using the practice, either through a shift to national pricing for stores catering for the one-stop-shop grocery market 
or a lessening on the extent of the goods price flexed, as became evident in the submissions made to the Competition 
Commission (2003) inquiry on the contemplated mergers involving Safeway.   
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7.  Consumer Welfare Considerations 
So far we have considered the preferences of the firms competing in the market without regard to how 
pricing policy decisions would impact on consumers.  While the local markets served may be 
geographically separate, retailers may nonetheless have some regard to consumer sentiment when 
practicing price discrimination – not least if consumers perceive that retailers are exploiting either a lack 
of competition or high demand levels by price gouging.  While negative sentiment may not necessarily 
impact demand in the short term, it could adversely impact demand in the longer-term if consumers shift 
their preferences to other products or indeed boycott retailers perceived to be “ripping off” local 
consumers.   
Accordingly, retailers may take some account of the impact of their pricing policy on consumer 
welfare.  Uniform pricing, by offering all consumers the same price regardless of their location, may be 
perceived as being inherently fairer (even when it may mean higher prices for some consumers and lower 
prices for others) than a discriminatory pricing policy in which the retailer customizes prices according to 
local demand or local competition conditions.  Indeed, this is a point often advanced by EDLP retailers 
that set national prices.  Equally, retailers that use local pricing may be more guarded about their pricing 
policy, preferring to keep consumers in the dark about how they are treated compared to consumers in 
other locations, thereby reinforcing the separation of local markets.38
Clearly, uniform pricing can normally be expected to benefit consumers in the monopoly markets 
relative to those in the duopoly market.  With this inherent welfare trade-off between the two groups in 
mind, we consider the overall impact on consumers by examining the respective levels of aggregate 
consumer surplus under each pricing regime, as an unweighted aggregation of the consumer utility 
functions.   
Specifically, aggregate consumer surplus, S, is taken as the sum of the (constrained) 
representative consumer utility functions over the three markets (i.e. respectively over V2(qA2,qB2), 
VA1(qA1) and VB1(qB1)): 
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38  Here, a common concern is the prospect of the media instigating a consumer backlash, even when local price 
differences may be genuinely cost driven by higher overheads and staff costs (e.g. “Tesco makes city shoppers pay a 
premium” Daily Mail (London), September 13, 2003; “M&S rip-off in stores in the South”, Daily Mail (London), 
September 12, 2003). 
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Evaluating the terms with respect to the different equilibrium values when both firms adopt local 
pricing and when they both adopt uniform pricing, the aggregate consumer surplus in each respective 
case, i.e. SLL and SUU, abstracting from any income effects, is: 
)30(
4)2)(1(
1 2
2
α+γ−γ+=
LLS
and 
)31(
)24)(1(
)36710)(1()36)(1(241310
22
432222432
γ−γ−γ+
γ+γ+γ−γ−γ+α+γ−γ−γ−α+γ+γ+γ−γ−=UUS
 
Taking the difference between the two levels and rearranging reveals: 
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As with the profit comparisons, the sign of the above expression rests on the sign of the term in 
square brackets on the numerator in the first part of the equation and the square bracketed term in the 
second part of the equation.  The following proposition establishes the market conditions where aggregate 
consumer surplus is higher depending on the choice by both firms of local pricing or uniform pricing:  
 
PROPOSITION 6. For α ∈ (0,1) there exists a zone in (α,γ) space for which aggregate consumer surplus is 
greater under local pricing.  This zone has an inner boundary where pm = pd while the other boundary, pm 
= pdZS, where ZS ≡ XS/YS, lies strictly above (i.e. outside) the first.  On the other side of these boundaries, 
uniform pricing by both firms offers higher aggregate consumer surplus. 
 
Again, as with the profit comparisons, conditions on the nature and shape of these boundaries can 
be readily identified.  The inner boundary is, of course, the same as before where pm = pd, i.e. strictly 
downward sloping and concave in (α,γ) space.  The outer boundary can be shown to be strictly downward 
sloping and concave.  Furthermore, the two boundaries converge at opposite extremes of the parameter 
space, i.e. as α Æ 1, γ Æ 0 and α Æ 0, γ Æ 1.   
It might at first seem that firms’ preferences would be directly at odds with consumers’ 
preferences.  However, this is not the case as the following proposition establishes:  
PROPOSITION 7. (a) For pm < pd then firms’ individual and joint preferences over pricing policy are 
directly at odds with those of consumers. (b) For pm > pd, firms’ individual choice of pricing policy 
leading to (U,U) or (U,L) is always at odds with consumers’ aggregate preference, but for (L,L) some 
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market conditions exist where there is a shared preference.  (c) For pm > pd, firms’ joint/coordinated 
choice of pricing policy leading to (L*,L*) is always at odds with consumers’ aggregate preference, but 
for (U*,U*) some market conditions exist where there is a shared preference.   
 
Proposition 7(a) makes immediate sense in view of the effect that uniform pricing has in these 
circumstances.  By comparison with local pricing, the averaging effect intensifies competition in the 
duopoly market, resulting in lower prices to the benefit of consumers, while raising prices in the 
monopoly markets where consumer surplus is low anyway.  The mutual preference for local pricing 
expressed in Proposition 7(b) is explained by the prisoners’ dilemma that the firms face, jointly wishing 
to coordinate on uniform pricing but not prepared to commit unilaterally to such a policy, thereby leading 
to lower prices in the duopoly market for the benefit of consumers overall.  In contrast, the mutual 
preference for uniform pricing expressed in Proposition 7(c) relates to the sizeable gains in surplus that 
consumers in the monopoly market make through the averaging effect of uniform prices, which more than 
offset the reduced surplus that consumers in the duopoly market suffer. 
To provide some further insight into the above propositions and their link with the outcomes of 
the previous section, Table 3 covers some examples of key magnitudes in particular cases.39  Taking Case 
1, this shows the common situation (pm < pd) where firms individually (and jointly) find it optimal to price 
locally, but consumers as a group would prefer uniform pricing.  Case 2, however, is more subtle and less 
common; it occurs for parameter constellations such that Z1 < pm/pd < ZS.  Here, the equilibrium outcome 
is local pricing, and this is the outcome preferred by consumers.  However, the firms face a prisoners’ 
dilemma and would jointly prefer uniform pricing.  This case is easy to explain intuitively.  It is akin to 
the well known result that Cournot is better for consumers than collusion (since collusion would lead to 
higher profits for the firms as a result of higher prices and reduced quantity but is not sustainable as an 
equilibrium in a single-stage game).  
The other two cases are illustrated in Figure 3.  In Case 3 (prices subscripted 3, being an example 
of the cases for which 1 < pm/pd < Z2) the equilibrium is for the firms to practice uniform pricing.  But in 
this case, consumers would prefer local pricing.  Finally, Case 4 (prices subscripted 4, an example of ZS < 
pm/pd < Z3) has firms practicing local pricing but preferring uniform pricing.  Moreover, if uniform pricing 
were imposed, both firms and consumers (as a group) would be better off.   
 
 
 
                                                     
39 Full details of these and other numerical examples are available on request from the authors. 
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Table 3.  Retailer Profits and Aggregate Consumer Surplus for Various Values of α and γ 
Firm-Level Profits Aggregate Consumer Surplus 
Pricing 
Configuration Case 1 α , γ  = 
0.5 
Case 2 
α = γ = 
0.6667 
Case 3 
α =0.5, γ 
= 0.75 
Case 4 
α =0.5,  
γ = 0.85 
Case 1 
α , γ  = 
0.5 
Case 2 
α = γ = 
0.6667 
Case 3 
 α = 0.5,  
γ = 0.75 
Case 4 
α =0.5,  
γ = 0.85 
(L,L) 0.2107 0.2236 0.1539 0.1238 0.3588 0.4486 0.4282 0.4712 
(U,L) 0.2048 0.2228 0.1545 0.1189 0.3696 0.4484 0.4266 0.4780 
(L,U) 0.2025 0.2334 0.1598 0.1365 0.3696 0.4484 0.4266 0.4780 
(U,U) 0.1985 0.2321 0.1599 0.1320 0.3779 0.4475 0.4252 0.4823 
Note:  Bold indicates equilibrium configurations; Italics indicates joint (firm or consumer) preferences 
 
 
- Figure 3 near here - 
 
This last is the most intriguing result.  If we compare local prices or uniform prices, we see in 
Figure 3 that moving from local to uniform implies price falling in the uncontested market and rising in 
the contested market.  Of course, quantity rises in the uncontested market and falls in the contested, but 
note also that quantity rises significantly overall in Case 4, unlike Case 3.  There is a powerful force 
making for profits and consumer surplus to move in opposite directions.  This is the transfer from one to 
the other as a result of an increase/decrease in price.  However, there is also another force that works in 
the same direction for both profit and consumer surplus, namely that an output increase is good, and an 
output decrease bad.  In Case 4, this latter effect is large. 
Another way to think of this positive link between profit and consumer surplus extends the 
intuition provided by Winter (1997).  Considering the firms first, a marginal increase in price above the 
duopoly level in the contested market is profit improving, whilst a marginal decrease in price below the 
monopoly level in the uncontested market has no impact, through the envelope theorem.  Of course, 
Winter’s intuition works only for marginal changes, but it indicates that there is scope for the firms to 
gain through moving to uniform prices.  Now consider the consumers.  Under local pricing, there are 
people in the uncontested market who are unable to consume the good, despite having higher reservation 
values than people in the contested market who do consume the good.  This is socially inefficient.  By 
moving to uniform pricing, some relatively high valuation consumers get to buy the good at the expense 
of some relatively low valuation consumers, meaning that there can be an aggregate gain in consumer 
surplus.  Thus there is no inconsistency between the observation that firms are better off and consumers, 
as a group, are better off, although it clearly happens only for a limited range of parameters. 
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8. Conclusion 
8.1. Managerial Implications 
Modern computer billing systems and scanning techniques have enabled micro-marketing to develop 
rapidly across retailing.  In this context, it might be seen as a natural weapon in the marketer’s armory in 
generating additional profit, along the lines of the very careful empirical work on the subject 
(Montgomery 1997, Chintagunta et al. 2003, inter alia).  Yet some market-leading retailers forsake local 
pricing in favor of uniform pricing.  Our analysis qualifies the belief that local pricing raises profit, by 
showing that there are strategic, as well as customer relations, reasons why it may have an adverse impact 
on profit.  However, it also suggests that only in quite specific circumstances will a move to uniform 
pricing be worthwhile, namely if it softens the nature of oligopolistic competition.  This means that in 
order to gain any possible profit advantage from moving to uniform pricing the retailer would need to 
undertake a form of unilateral commitment that is both visible and essentially irreversible or, if as a joint 
move, be in a situation where tacit collusion over pricing policy choices can be supported.  The greatest 
scope for uniform pricing appears to be from a joint move.  Nevertheless, a unilateral move to uniform 
pricing may be worth making although it can involve benefiting a rival more.  
Public statements in support of a permanent move to EDLP might be one means of adopting a 
uniform pricing policy with a softening impact.40  Alternatively, retailers should look to lock-in their 
pricing policy through expensive commitments (such as printing catalogues for national use like the 
furniture retailer IKEA, or have goods delivered with standardized integral pricing tags – like clothing 
retailers Zara and Marks & Spencer). 
In all of this, consumers’ attitudes cannot be forgotten.  Local pricing necessarily entails at least 
one group of consumers being made worse off than they would otherwise be under uniform pricing.  Thus 
at least one group may feel aggrieved by micro-marketing.  Therefore using local pricing may well impact 
detrimentally on the image of retailers in the long run (potentially affecting future demand).  The 
interesting case is that where uniform pricing can benefit both firms and consumers.  In these 
circumstances a true win-win situation may arise (especially as the consumer benefit may go to the poorer 
consumers). 
 
8.2. Extensions 
Beyond our simple model there are other factors, apart from concerns about retail image, which may 
impact on the choice of pricing policy.  First, despite advances in information technology, there may be 
                                                     
40  See footnote 32 above in relation to declarations by Asda. 
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significant costs associated with a complicated local pricing policy, involving highly customized prices.41  
Second, there may be longer-term considerations, with local pricing providing greater flexibility in 
driving out existing competitors or even deterring new competitors from entering local markets, allowing 
the retailer to consolidate its local position.  Third, and in contrast to the flexibility advantages of local 
pricing, uniform pricing provides a clear, consistent policy that may facilitate greater price understanding 
between rivals, lessening competitive intensity (though may ultimately be deemed illegal if it amounts to 
tacit collusion in the form of full parallel pricing).  Fourth, it obscures the possible impact of retail 
mergers.42
 Finally, we see potential for future research in changing or relaxing some of the assumptions in 
our model.  For example, it might be interesting to see how preferences for uniform pricing change under 
different specific demand assumptions.  It would also be interesting to consider asymmetries between the 
firms, for example in respect of the number of markets that each covers.  Intuitively, we would expect 
large chains with more monopoly markets to be more inclined towards uniform pricing than smaller 
chains, because a large chain would be in a better position to make a profit sacrifice to dampen overall 
competition, than would a smaller chain obliged to give up considerable local monopoly profits to have 
any noticeable effect on competition in duopoly markets shared with the large chain.43  Another line of 
inquiry might be to consider cost differences at the local level.  We conjecture that the scope for uniform 
pricing would more likely hold if operating costs were higher in more affluent, but more competitive, 
“urban” areas than in poorer, but less competitive, “rural” areas if this closes the gap between lower 
prices in the former areas and higher prices in the latter areas by reducing local profit sacrifice.  
 
 
 
                                                     
41  For instance, it has been estimated that local pricing and promotions in respect of the discounts, printing and 
administration cost the UK retailer Safeway (as an extensive user of zone pricing prior to being taken over by 
Morrison) around one percent of its turnover (McGoldrick 2002, p. 386). 
42 This argument may, for example, have had some bearing on the developments in the UK grocery sector with 
Tesco, Sainsbury and Morrison all going on the acquisition trail in recent years.  This argument also relates to the 
blocked Staples/Office Depot merger, where the FTC was able to show that this “3 to 2” merger would likely raise 
prices in local markets based on existing prices being significantly higher in monopoly and duopoly local markets 
than in triopoly markets – see Dalkir and Warren-Boulton (1999) for details. 
43  Interestingly, this pattern does match what has happened in the UK grocery sector, described above in section 2, 
where the large retailers have moved to uniform pricing but some of the smaller chains still practice local pricing. 
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APPENDIX 
Proofs to Propositions 2-7 
PROPOSITION 2.  PROOF.  Adapting the method used in Dobson and Waterson (2005), let us take the case 
of firm A (noting that firm B’s case is directly analogous).  The sign of the equation in (26) rests on two 
terms.  These can be re-expressed to yield two conditions, relating α and γ, such that when either holds 
the value of (26) is zero.  Specifically ΠLA L   = ΠUA L   if α = 2(1–γ)/(2–γ) or α = [2(1–γ)/(2–γ)]Z1. Note that the 
first condition amounts to pm = pd while the second is pm = pdZ1.  Next, observe that Z1 takes a value 
strictly greater than unity as long as γ ∈ (0,1). This follows since X1 – Y1 = 8γ2(2–γ2) > 0.  Thus these two 
loci divide the profit space in dimensions (α, γ) into three segments. Expression (26) must take on either a 
positive or a negative value in each of these segments. Further, by simple substitution, of (α, γ) values 
(0,0) and (1,1), we see that in the lowest and uppermost segments, the expression is positive. Next note 
that the expression is strictly convex with respect to α since ∂2(ΠLA L  – ΠUA L  )/∂α2 = Y1/[2(8–5γ2)2] > 0. Hence 
in the middle section, the expression is negative.    Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION 3.  PROOF.  By exactly the same method as the proof to Proposition 2, observing that, from 
(27), ΠLA U  = ΠUAU   if pm = pd or pm = pdZ2, where Z2 > 1 for γ ∈ (0,1) since X2 – Y2 = 2γ2(4 – γ – γ2)(8 – 5γ2) 
> 0, and that ∂2(ΠLA U  – ΠUAU  )/∂α2 = 2(2–γ)Y2/[2(8–5γ2)(4–γ–2γ2)]2 > 0.   Q.E.D.   
 
PROPOSITION 4.  PROOF.  Noting that (26) and (27) each yield two equality conditions and that, in terms 
of (α,γ) space, the inner boundary for both is the same, i.e. pm = pd, proof amounts to showing that the 
outer boundary for the former lies outside of the latter.  This will be true if Z1 > Z2. Observing that both 
identities and their components are signed positive, it follows that if X1Y2 – X2Y1 > 0 then Z1 – Z2 > 0. 
This is indeed the case as X1Y2 – X2Y1 = 4γ2(1–γ2)(8–5γ2)[64–48γ–64γ2+40γ3+17γ4–8γ5] = 4γ2(1–γ2)(8–
5γ2)[8(1–γ)(2–γ2)(4+γ–γ2)+γ4] > 0, noting that all bracketed terms are positive.   Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION 5.  PROOF. The existence of the zone where uniform pricing is jointly preferred and the 
nature of its two boundaries follow directly from the method used as the proof for Proposition 2, 
observing that, from (28), (ΠLA L  + ΠLB L ) = (ΠUA U  = ΠUBU  ) if pm = pd or pm = pdZ3, where Z3 > 1 for γ ∈ (0,1) 
since X3 – Y3 = 8γ – 2γ2 – 4γ3 > 0, and that ∂2(ΠLA L +ΠLB L – ΠUA U – ΠUBU  )/∂α2 = Y3/[(4–γ2–2γ2)2] > 0.  Next, 
from Proposition 3 we know that the upper boundary for privately preferring uniform pricing when the 
rival is uniform pricing (i.e. pm = pdZ1) lies, in (α,γ) space, strictly above and outside that corresponding to 
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when the rival adopts local pricing (i.e. pm = pdZ2), this follows since Z1 > Z2.  Accordingly, to conclude 
the proof we are required to show that Z3 > Z1.  This is the case since X3Y1 – X1Y3 = 4γ(2–γ)(2–γ2)[16–
4γ2–10γ2+γ3] > 0.    Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION 6.  PROOF.  The proof is on the same basis as that to Proposition 2.  Specifically, we find 
that, from (32), SLL = SUU if α = 2(1–γ)/(2–γ) or α = 2(1–γ)XS/[(2–γ)YS], with the former condition 
amounting to pm = pd and the latter to pm = pdZS. Then, observe that ZS > 1 for γ ∈ (0,1), since XS – YS = 
8γ – 2γ2 – 4γ3 > 0. Thus, the second condition requires higher values of α for it to hold when compared to 
the first condition.  Next, evaluate the surplus comparison with the extreme values of α and γ and observe 
that ∂2(SLL–SUU)/∂α2 = – YS/[2(4–γ2–2γ2)2] < 0, hence the expression is strictly concave with respect to α.  
It then follows that the zone which supports SLL > SUU applies where α,γ ∈ (0,1) with pm = pd operating as 
the lower boundary and pm = pdZS as the upper boundary.   Q.E.D. 
 
PROPOSITION 7.  PROOF.  (a) By direct reference to Propositions 2, 3, 5 and 6.  (b) By reference to 
Propositions 2, 3, 4 and 6, while noting that XSY2 – X2YS = 4γ(1–γ)(2–γ)[32–8γ–36γ2+6γ3+11γ4] = 4γ(1–
γ)(2–γ)[11(1–γ2)2+6(1–γ2)(1–γ)+(15–2γ–8γ2)] > 0, so ZS > Z1 and thus the boundary pm = pdZS lies above 
the boundary pm = pdZ1 in (α,γ) space. (c) By reference to Propositions 5 and 6, while noting XSY3 – X3YS 
= – 4γ(2–γ)(4–γ–2γ2) < 0, so ZS < Z3 and thus the boundary pm = pdZS lies below the boundary pm = pdZ1.    
 Q.E.D. 
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    Figure 2.  Configurations under Joint Preferences   
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Figure 3.  Producer and Consumer Welfare across Markets in Cases 3 and 4 
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